Introduction
This paper is an attempt to go beyond the standard theory of marriage and divorce in order to account for the reciprocal relationship between brideprice and probability of divorce that was suggested to us by field observations in West Africa.
The standard theory of marriage proposed by economists is based on a rather straightforward extension of the market framework to the issue of spouse selection (Becker, 1974 (Becker, , 1981 Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993) . Marriages can thus be modelled as the equilibrium of a matching market which 'assigns' men and women to each other or to remain single until better opportunities come along. The so-called assortative mating is effected through the establishment of equilibrium spot prices or incomes that include dowries (understood as payments made by the bride or the bride's family to the groom or the groom's family), brideprices (understood as reverse payments from the groom's to the bride's side), leisure and power. A direct implication is that the side holding the precious resource, e.g. the bride's family in a situation of scarcity of women, can ask for a side payment in order to compensate for the higher value of its indivisible contribution.
At the root of this approach is the utility-maximizing rational choice perspective typical of neoclassical economics. People marry when the expected utility from being married exceeds the utility from remaining single; and they remain married as long as the expected utility from doing so is greater than the utility expected from divorce, where the latter is affected by the prospects for remarriage. In explaining marriage-related events, emphasis is placed on determinants of the gains from marriage, such as the relative productivity of men and women inside and outside the home; income; age; education and other traits affecting productivity.
In spite of its simplicity, the neoclassical economic theory of marriage and divorce has proven compatible with some significant stylised facts and with some interesting anthropological evidence. For example, given that the presence of a dowry can be interpreted as reflecting a lower wage for the wife, this theory can explain (i) why dowry seems to be strongly linked with monogamous (and polyandrous) marriage all over the world; (ii) why it is that in SubSaharan Africa the institution of brideprice is more often found in polygynous than in monogamous societies; and (iii) why in the same region brideprice payments tend to be higher in more polygynous societies (Grossbard, 1978: 35-36) . As a matter of fact, polygamy implies that there is a stronger demand for wife services.
Furthermore, the explanation of the shift from a brideprice to a dowry system proposed by Boserup (1970) and Goody (1976) can be schematically brought down to a demand-supply argument. According to them, indeed, the brideprice system characterizes land-abundant countries where extensive forms of land use go hand in hand with a large role assigned to women in productive and reproductive activities. Hence the strong demand for wives in the societies concerned, which tends to be reflected in polygynous marriages and brideprice payments as well, one could add, as in large differences in mean age at marriage of men and women and large proportions of women married at all ages. By contrast, as land becomes more scarce, it is more intensively used and the productive role of men relative to women increases concomitantly. The demand for wife services declines, as a result of which brideprices become lower to be eventually replaced by dowries (which are negative brideprices), and the incidence of polygynous unions decreases. In addition, differences in age at marriage narrow down (because women marry later) and proportions of women married at all ages fall.
One serious problem with the neoclassical approach to marriage, however, is the complete absence of strategic considerations. For decisions that have significant and long-term consequences, it is unrealistic to assume that people behave in a competitive-like manner, simply adjusting their actions to market signals such as the ruling brideprice or dowry. In this paper, therefore, we want to investigate the impact, on the marriage institution, of the strategic relationships between a bride and her family on the one hand, and between a bride and a groom on the other hand. The focus is put on the simultaneous determination of the brideprice (or dowry) and the probability of divorce. The central idea is that, when setting the brideprice, the bride or the bride's father takes explicitly into account the likely influence of the brideprice amount on conjugal tensions (including ill-treatment of the wife by the husband) and the probability of divorce, which in turn affect the wife's well-being.
A second major problem with Becker's framework is that it relies on a private good approach. More precisely, the household is viewed mainly as a source of consumption of private goods by the spouses and as a locus of production and reproduction where managerial economies (scale economies, specialization gains, and complementarities) can be reaped. An alternative approach that we choose to follow is to consider the household or the family as a place where a public good is produced and to ignore the material determinants of the utilities thereby generated. To sum up, our intended purpose is to enrich the dominant theoretical apparatus by allowing factors other than supplydemand forces, and other than material determinants of utilities, to bear upon the level and the direction of marriage payments.
Our contribution is not only theoretical but also empirical. In fact, the idea of strategic determination of brideprices arose from field investigations that we conducted in the Senegal river valley in 1999. Interviews with Senegalese men and women convinced us that strategic considerations are indeed foremost in their minds when they negotiate marriage payments, and that the potentially perverse effect of high brideprices is a cause of worry for a significant proportion of them. The detailed data collected on several aspects of the marriage histories of sample women actually allow for more rigorous tests based on the use of appropriate econometric techniques.
The outline of the paper is as follows. After providing general information about sample data and framework, Section 2 presents the empirical evidence that motivated this research, using simple descriptive statistics. The data used are first-hand data collected in the Senegal river valley in West Africa. In Section 3, our theory of brideprice determination is presented. First, our modelling strategy is broadly explained and situated in the context of the existing literature (Subsection 3.1). We then proceed by describing in detail the model supporting the theory (Subsection 3.2) before deriving and discussing its main comparative-static results (Subsection 3.3). Section 4 is then devoted to econometric testing of some key predictions derived from the model, which is done on the basis of our Senegalese data. Subsection 4.1 discusses an econometric methodology suitable for the analysis of brideprices, given the biases that plague straightforward approaches. Subsection 4.2 presents and interprets the results obtained. Section 5 concludes.
Qualitative insights
Data have been collected in sixteen villages of the Senegal river valley that lies in the northernmost part of the country and separates it from Mauritania. Of unequal sizes, these villages are located in the delta area (department of Dagana) and the middle valley (departments of Podor and Matam) along the main road running from Saint-Louis to Bakel. Seven of the sample villages are located in the former zone while the remaining nine villages are situated in the latter. In addition to focus group interviews, household questionnaires have been administered separately to 185 women and to 83 men. The questionnaire has been conceived in such a way that it elicits detailed information not only about the personal characteristics (education, age, occupation,…) of the persons interviewed but also about their personal histories regarding, in particular: -Marriage practices and contracts (including the brideprice) based on detailed recording of all marriage histories; -Role of brides in the negotiation of the brideprice; -Reasons for elopements, divorces and separations; -Procedures in case of divorce and separation (family negotiations, repayment of the brideprice,…); -Attitudes of women and men with respect to marriage payments, levirate and polygamous marriages; -Customary rules regulating women's access to land within marriage situations, and in the event of separation/divorce, unwed motherhood and widowhood; -Customary rules of inheritance for the land (sharing rules, timing of the division of family property, durable character of the division);
As recalled in Section 1, marriage payments are conventionally regarded as a price that serves to match men and women assortatively. The amount and the direction of such payments are therefore entirely explained in terms of a supplydemand argument. Yet, in so far as a rule prevails that the brideprice must be returned to the husband or his family in the event of a marriage break-up, strategic considerations come into play. As a matter of fact, parents eager to seal important inter-family alliances and, consequently, to avoid separation or divorce would presumably set the brideprice at a high level so as to make its repayment difficult in case of conjugal tensions. Parents of the groom would thereby ensure that the bride is seriously discouraged from seeking separation, because of her inability to dig out the brideprice money by herself, and her own parents' refusal to come to her help. Note that in the general case the bride's parents receive the brideprice from the groom's party and they use it to meet family expenditures, including the payment of brideprices on behalf of their own sons. In such conditions, the repayment obligation in the event of marriage failure falls to the parents of the bride and not to the bride herself. Heavy pressure on the daughter to stay with her husband can then be expected from them. By agreeing to receive a high brideprice on the occasion of their daughter's marriage, the bride's parents would thus manifest the importance they attach to the union and their willingness to preserve it in all circumstances. In other words, a high brideprice serves as a commitment device aimed at minimizing the risk of marriage breakup.
Neither the groom's nor the bride's point of view figures out in the above reasoning. The fact of the matter is that in conventionally arranged marriages they do not have a real say in marriage negotiations. Consider the standpoint of young women. When they become better aware of their own interests and when they are ready and able to express them in an articulate fashion, one should expect them to bear pressure on their parents so as to make them content with lower brideprice payments. They would thus be re-assured about their future conditional ability to repay the brideprice and thereby evade the trap of an unhappy union. At least, this is the kind of scenario suggested by the anecdotal evidence available (see, e.g., Jewsiewicki, 1993 for Congo). Another strategic consideration possibly in the mind of a bride is the concern that the man whom she loves may be unable to pay a high brideprice.
Our data on Senegal confirm that the brideprice has to be returned to the husband's family in the event of marriage breakdown.
1 Yet, they also show that this repayment obligation applies only when the woman is considered responsible for the splitting of the couple. In practice, assignment of guilt is highly biased against women since it is only when the husband is impotent, irreducibly unfaithful, or when he repeatedly indulges in acts of physical violence against his wife that the latter is forgiven for running away from him. The taking of a new wife by the husband, accusations of unequal treatment of the different wives, and continuous conflicts between co-wives are not regarded as misdemeanours that could justify a woman in leaving her husband.
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In order to check the extent to which women actually believe that high brideprices run counter to their interests due to the repayment problem in the event of marriage failure, we have asked them in a general, non-directive manner whether they think that high brideprices are unfavourable to them and, in the affirmative, what are the shortcomings involved. the same question has been asked to men. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 below. It is evident from Table 1 that around 60 percent of the sample women have found high brideprices to be problematic for one reason or another. It is noteworthy, however, that repayment problems in the event of marriage failure is not the main concern expressed by them. As a matter of fact, hardly one-fifth of the women who worry about high brideprices have specifically mentioned 1 In actual fact, the brideprice has three components the latter of which only is to be returned in the event of marriage failure. First, there is a core element, the amount of which is fixed by custom, that serves the function of legitimizing the marriage. Part of it is actually conceived of as "the price of virginity" and is exclusively meant to enable the bride to purchase necessities such as clothes, ornaments, utensils, working tools and other articles necessary for the functioning of the new household. Because divorced women as well as widows and unwed mothers have lost their virginity, their family cannot claim this element of the brideprice. Second, there is a sum destined for the financing of a feast where friends from the same age group as the bride meet to eat, sing and dance in her honour. Various gifts of food items, contributions to the local mosque, and other miscellaneous expenses also form part of this category of marriage expenditures. Third, there is a component of the brideprice which is fixed in the course of negotiations between the parties concerned and which can therefore freely vary from case to case. A portion of it is seen as a compensation aimed at rewarding the bride's parents, and sometimes also elder members of the extended family, for their efforts in bringing her up. Contrary to the first two elements of the brideprice, the custom provides that payments made on this score must be paid back if the woman is considered responsible for the break-up of the marriage and the husband insists on being indemnified. 2 Not unsurprisingly, statements regarding the assignment of actual responsibilities in concrete cases of marriage breaks up are much less clear than those regarding the principles governing the obligation of brideprice repayment. As a matter of fact, there is no neat relationship between statements about whether the brideprice had actually to be repaid in past events of a marriage failure, on the one hand, and statements about the cause of the failure and who was to blame for it, on the other hand. For this reason, we will abstain from using these data in the empirical analysis presented in Section 4. such problems. By contrast, 55 percent of the same have laid emphasis on the fact that high brideprices contribute to "alienate women", "to transform them into commodities" or "into slaves of their husband", all strong expressions intended to reflect deep-seated frustrations and, sometimes, intense suffering. Behind these expressions, as further probing revealed, lies the fear that the husband and his family may resent high brideprices because of the financial stress caused. The resentment lingers on when the brideprice is paid in instalments and the husband or his family regret having agreed to an unbearable burden, especially if they find fault with the wife or daughter-in-law (say, because she does not bear children, is not productive enough, has a difficult character and does not get on well with the in-laws, …). In such conditions, the woman is exposed to a serious risk of harassment and ill-treatment by the husband and his relatives because she is considered to be the cause of the problems encountered by them. For another thing, 12 percent of women have pointed out that high brideprices have the disadvantage of causing the indebtedness of the husband (together with the fact that they involve a waste of money), yet without complaining about their own suffering as a result of such indebtedness.
Finally, in a context where love marriages gradually emerge as an alternative to marriages arranged by the two families concerned (the former represent almost 40 percent of all unions recorded in our sample survey), it is not surprising that some women (more than 8 percent) view high brideprices as a potential hindrance to the free choice of a bride by a relatively poor groom. In this connection, it bears emphasis that love marriages do not imply a radical departure from customary unions but only a partial emancipation from the parents' tutorship. In point of fact, if youngsters elect themselves in the absence of any interference by their parents, they are usually keen to have their choice approved by the latter, and to have their union sanctioned according to custom (which implies the payment of a brideprice and the performance of prescribed rituals). Note, moreover, that love marriages are much more frequent for women who have already been married in the past: while the proportion of unions arranged by the parents is 65 percent for first marriages, it is only 34 percent for the second, third and fourth marriages recorded in our interviews. Clearly, the gradual spread of love marriages starts with adult and experienced women to later spill over into younger generations through a demonstration effect.
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Let us now turn to the opinions expressed by men (see Table 2 ). As expected, since they are on the paying side, the proportion of men who find fault with high brideprices (more than three-fourths) is much higher than in the case of women. Also expected is the fact that by far the most important reason for men's resistance against high brideprices is the waste of money or the financial stress that they involve for the husband (43 percent of the total number of men, or 57 percent of the men who find fault with high brideprices). This said, the most instructive finding emerging from the table is the following : almost 25 percent of sampled men have spontaneously admitted that high brideprices tend "to make marriages difficult" (10.8 percent), alienate women (9.7 percent), or drive husbands to harass and ill-treat their wife (3.6 percent). In other words, men themselves are to some extent aware that women can be harmed under conditions of duress created by high brideprices. Presumably, therefore, while fixing the brideprice for his daughter a man should think of the negative consequences of large amounts for her future well-being. Our sample data show that on average women who chose their husband themselves upon their first marriage belong to younger generations than those who went through an arranged marriage. When all marriages are taken into consideration, two effects are at play that run into opposite directions: the aforementioned generational effect, on the one hand, and the effect resulting from the fact that love marriages are more often observed on the occasion of second and third marriages, on the other hand. In our sample, love marriages are found among comparatively young women, indicating that the former effect outweighs the latter. * The percentage total exceeds 100 percent because some men have mentioned several shortcomings of high brideprices.
A theory of brideprice determination

Prolegomena
The model developed in this paper is a simple sequential game borrowing some assumptions that have been influential in population economics. The Sonnenschein-Mäntel-Debreu theorem on the aggregate demand curve has shown that it is a very demanding hypothesis to represent a household's decision process by the optimisation of a single representative agent. Intra-household bargaining, be it cooperative or non-cooperative, has been widely used (Bergstrom, 1996 (Bergstrom, , 1997 Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) because it is considered both as a more satisfactory representation of decision-making processes at the household level and as a source of empirical predictions. A very convenient model to characterize marriage, introduced by Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) among others, consists of depicting a production unit that generates a household public good. Since the matching issue (who marries with whom) is not addressed in these models, it is convenient to assume away any endogenous relationship between marriage and welfare. The public good approach makes marriage an exogenous contribution to welfare, a parametric assumption compatible with both the most materialistic and the most romantic conceptions of marriage. Our model runs as follows. There are three players, who intervene sequentially, with one move of nature. The father of the bride chooses the brideprice in a first stage. Nature then picks up the groom's constant marginal rate of substitution between money and the household public good. Thereafter, the groom chooses his level of contribution to the household public good. Finally, the bride chooses to stay or to leave. The key aspect in this model is that the father of the bride has to repay part of the brideprice to the groom if his daughter leaves her husband, while the latter's propensity to induce such a behaviour (through low contributions to the household public good) is not a public information at the first stage of the game. A low contribution by the husband can therefore be interpreted as a set of actions that will make his wife break up.
Bloch and Rao (forthcoming) also modelled strategic conjugal violence, whereby the husband hurts his wife's well-being in order to extract a payment from his in-laws. There are several differences between our set-up and Bloch and Rao's. In conformity with their field study in India, divorce is not an option in their model, unlike what is implied in the last stage of our game. Moreover, they view conjugal violence exerted by the husband as a way of extracting a voluntary extra-payment (or a partial refund of the brideprice) from the bride's family, and this extra-payment is motivated by the threat of abandoning the wife. Bloch and Rao's story relies on a signalling mechanism, in which the abandonment threat is made credible by resort to violence. The bride's family gives in to violent behaviour because it can only be committed by husbands willing to abandon their wife if their request is not satisfied. Our model is a simpler story of profit maximisation (by the father of the bride) under asymmetric information regarding the groom's participation constraint. Such simplicity conveys a benefit since we do not need to assume that the groom's preferences remain private information after marriage, an hypothesis that underlies Bloch and Rao's signalling model.
There are a number of similarities, mainly on the empirical side, between the two research projects, however. In particular, it is noteworthy that the two models yield the same prediction of a positive relationship between marital outcomes (divorce in our model or violence in Bloch and Rao's) and marriage payments. Bloch and Rao estimate the probability of occurrence of violence with an endogenous dowry variable; we do the same with a divorce equation, but we also estimate a brideprice equation with an endogenous divorce probability. On the theoretical side, both models can explain a transition from the brideprice to the dowry system, a phenomenon actually observed in Bloch and Rao's dataset.
The model
In the following, we want to outline the forces that are susceptible of affecting the evolution of the brideprice in an African context, leaving aside the marriage market which has rather well-known outcomes (see, e.g., Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993; Ensminger and Knight, 1997) . This implies that we inquire into the interrelationships between the brideprice, on the one hand, and male agricultural productivity, divorce rate, the assertion of women's interests, women's education level, and the groom's propensity to divorce strategically, on the other hand. More particularly, we want to produce an explanation for a downward trend of brideprice amounts that does not rely on the increasing number of women of marriageable age relative to that of men. In the case of the Senegal river valley, indeed, such downward trend emerges from our data (if brideprices are measured in real terms) whereas women of marriageable age do not seem to be comparatively more abundant.
Two alternative explanations suggest themselves. The first one is derived from the work of Boserup and Goody on the basis of long-term empirical facts pertaining to Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is grounded on the presumably diminishing productive role of women as agricultural activities intensify in response to population growth and commercialisation of agriculture. In terms of our model (which uses a strategic framework rather than a supply/demand argument), the equilibrium brideprice must fall as the husband's agricultural productivity rises relative to that of the wife. The second explanation is derived from the above-described evidence (see Section 2) hinting that fathers are increasingly sensitive to the aspirations of their daughters, especially to the impact of the brideprice on the risk of divorce. In terms of our model, the equilibrium brideprice must decrease as the bride's father becomes more altruistic with respect to his daughters' welfare.
The model proposed is a sequential game with three players: the bride's father, the husband and the wife. We consider that, in the course of marriage life, both husband and wife contribute, although not necessarily on a equal footing, to a local public good that affects their individual utilities. Such a public good needs not be interpreted narrowly as an economic output but can more realistically be viewed as the couple's degree of harmony resulting from their respective actions. In the model, also, the husband's refusal to provide any contribution to the household will induce the wife to separate with the consequence that she will have to repay the brideprice to her husband. Prescribed by custom, such an obligation on the part of the woman creates a room for strategic playing by the husband. The strategic play of the husband can also operate in a different manner that is nevertheless analytically equivalent to the afore-described mechanism. As a matter of fact, since the payment of the brideprice typically occurs in instalments, by causing his wife to separate, the husband can bring the payment to a halt and thereby appropriate to himself the brideprice.
The last crucial aspect of our game is that the father of the bride does not know the groom's type, that is, his specific propensity to divorce strategically. Given this asymmetric information, the brideprice is set by the former in the light of probabilistic considerations. As hinted at above, the game is played sequentially. The game tree represented in Figure 1 describes the way in which successive moves take place.
In the first stage, the bride's father (F) chooses the amount of the brideprice (B). In the second stage, Nature (N) draws the type (v) of the groom (the game does not specify whether the father or the bride is responsible for the choice of the groom). In the third stage, the groom or husband (H) chooses his contribution (x) to the household's local public good while in the fourth and last stage the wife decides (δ) whether to stay in, or separate from the household. B takes on a real value; δ is equal to one if divorce occurs and zero otherwise; and x is equal to either 1/2 or 1, bearing in mind that x=1 implies that the husband contributes his fair share to the household (with the result that his wife is induced to stay) while x=1/2 implies that he does not (with the result that she is motivated to depart).
Figure 1: Game tree
The payoff functions of the three agents, U f (the utility of the bride's father), U h (the utility of the husband), and U d (the utility of the bride or daughter), are specified as follows:
with f'(x) ≥ 0; a≥0; v≥0; c≥0;
where β is the weight attached by the father to his daughter's utility (the father is assumed to be altruistic); c is the unit (constant) cost of contributing to the household; a is the productivity of the husband's contribution while (1-a) is that of the wife or daughter; the function f [-] is the household's production function describing the way in which contributions by both spouses get transformed into a local public good interpretable as the household's well-being; W is the latter's exit option, that is, the amount of wealth that she can obtain outside of her marriage; and v is a random variable describing the groom's type which corresponds to the extent to which he is willing to trade off the local public good f against the recouped brideprice payment (grooms are thus assumed to differ in terms of their preferences). We denote by G the cumulative density function of v. Note that, when the husband contributes 1 unit to the household and his wife stays with him, the joint amount of their contributions is equal to 1. Also, x is not allowed to take on the zero value (but only a positive value arbitrarily set at either ½ or 1, for the sake of commodity) so that the husband's welfare in case of marriage break-up is f(ax) + vB -cx, which remains dependent on a. The utility of the daughter's father is the sum of two components: (i) the direct utility coming from the wealth acquired through the payment of the brideprice by the groom or the groom's father, and (ii) the indirect utility that he derives from his daughter's well-being. The utility of the groom or husband in the event that the marriage holds (δ = 0) is the amount of the local public good f minus the cost of his own contribution to that good, whereas it is equal to f(ax) + vB -cx in the event that the marriage breaks up (δ = 1). Likewise, the utility of the daughter or the wife is the amount of the local public good f in the event that the marriage holds (the cost of her contribution can be ignored for the sake of convenience since it will not affect our analytic results), and the amount of her exit option net of the repaid brideprice in the event that the marriage breaks up. We make the sensible assumption that, if her husband contributes fairly to the household (x = 1), the bride obtains a higher utility from marriage than from being alone: f(1) > W. Since f(1) > W automatically implies f(1) > W -B when B > 0 (that is, in the case of the brideprice system −see below for the situation in which B < 0 and a dowry is paid by the bride's father rather than the other way around), this assumption is tantamount to assuming that, under these circumstances of a fairly contributing husband, the woman prefers to stay with him than to separate or divorce.
In order to solve the game, we start by computing the daughter's best reply, then the groom's, and, finally, the father's. From the daughter's utility function, we can assert that δ = 1 ! f(ax + 1 -a) < W -B. Given our assumption that f(1) > W, this condition is tantamount to x = ½ and B < W -f(1 -a/2). In particular, we can conclude that, if the brideprice is set at too high a level, the woman becomes locked into her marriage. Otherwise, she leaves if and only if her husband does not contribute fairly to the household. Aware of this reaction and the associated lock-in phenomenon, the husband will never contribute fairly if the brideprice is too high. More formally,
Rewriting the second condition, we have
prob (δ=1), the utility of the daughter's father can be written as the following expected utility function:
We are now in a position to compute the father's best response, i.e. the equilibrium brideprice. It is clear from the above that no finite brideprice exceeding W -f(1-a/2) will be the father's optimum, since the daughter's dominant strategy would then be to stay with her husband as a result of which her utility is independent of the brideprice. In formal terms:
The case of an interior solution is characterized by the inequality B* < W -f(1-a/2) and the following first-order condition:
The first two terms of equation (1) reflect the direct impact of the payment of one additional unit of brideprice on the bride's father's utility. It actually comprises a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect is the increased utility associated with the marginal income thereby obtained. As for the negative effect, it is the expected loss of utility that is caused by the increased repayment burden weighing on the daughter if she is induced to divorce, which she does with probability [1-G(v*)] in equilibrium. The third term in equation (1) is an indirect effect resulting from the increase in the probability of divorce that is caused by an increase in the brideprice amount 4 . The first-order equilibrium condition therefore means that the brideprice amount must be set by the daughter's father at a level such that his marginal direct utility gain u'(B) is exactly equal to the expected loss of utility arising from the increased repayment burden weighing on his daughter plus the utility loss resulting from the increased probability of divorce 5 . 4 This becomes evident when it is borne in mind that (-v*/B) is the derivative of v* with respect to B, dv*/dB, and that [f(1) -W + B] is the utility gain for the woman if she is married with a husband who contributes fairly compared to a situation where she is alone. 
In the following, we will focus our attention on the empirically pertinent case of a finite equilibrium brideprice. The assumption guaranteeing this in the model is:
Clearly, this condition implies that the function u(B) does not increase unboundedly with B 6 .
Comparative statics
We are interested in knowing the effects on the equilibrium brideprice of changes in the woman's education level, in the attention paid by the father to her daughter's own perception of her well-being, in the productivity of men compared to women in agricultural activities, in the intrinsic preferences of couples to stay together rather than to divorce, and in the distribution of men's preferences. Within the framework of the above model, a higher level of education of women is translated into a higher exit option value W; an increased attention of the father to her daughter's own perception of her well-being is reflected in an increase of β; an increase in comparative male agricultural productivity is represented by an increase in a; an increased payoff of staying together holding the exit option value constant is described as a parallel shift of the function f; and, finally, a change in the distribution of men's preferences is reflected in a similar shift of the cumulative density function G(v*), with the appropriate truncation to ensure that G is bounded by one. Using the implicit function theorem and assuming the second-order condition to hold −that is, assuming that dΩ/dB < 0−, we compute the first derivatives of the equilibrium brideprice with respect to the above parameters. 6 As illustrated below, we assume that U f = Φ(B) tends asymptotically towards a finite value after having reached a local maximum:
Brideprice amount Utility of the bride's father Four of these derivatives can be signed unambiguously while the fifth one has a sign that depends on a condition that is described below. The results are the following:
The first and most important result is that the brideprice is negatively correlated with the father's altruism parameter in equilibrium. This can be interpreted as the effect of changing cultural conditions. An aspect of modernity is indeed that a father judge his daughter's well-being according to her perception rather than paternalistically. Another way to understand an increased β is that well-being derived by women from their marriage (as represented by f) is taken increasingly into account when their father sets the brideprice. This shows how modernization, independently of marriage market effects, can cause a continuous downfall in the brideprice. As will be explained below, it can even explain a reversal of the brideprice, that is, its transformation into a dowry.
The second result is expected: the women's exit option value is positively correlated with the brideprice set by their their father. The parameter W reflects several forces simultaneously: the rising level of women's education, the opening up of non-agricultural job opportunities for women, the enhanced social status of divorced or separated women can all account for growing brideprices.
A positive uniform unit shift in f reflects an increase in the household's intrinsic value of staying together and hence in the opportunity cost of separation. The negative sign of dB*/df results from the fact that fathers anticipate this effect and, accordingly, lower the brideprice in order to reduce the probability of divorce. Note that, the brideprice being held constant, an uniform unit shift in f would change neither v* nor [1-G(v*) ], the probability of divorce. This is not as surprising as it may seem because, in the logic of the model, the woman's decision to divorce is induced by the action of her husband whose exit option value is unaffected by an uniform rise in f. Since U d increases as a result of that rise, the father restores the tangency condition by lowering B* so that u'(B*) increases.
The comparative statics with respect to G must be performed with caution as uniform shifts in G are not compatible with G being a cumulative density function (by definition, bounded by one). However, this is unimportant here since we know that in equilibrium G < 1. The shift in G means that, for all values of v, the probability of drawing a husband who values the recouping of the brideprice higher than v is lower. Consequently, all other things remaining equal, the probability of divorce is also lower. The bride's father uses this favourable opportunity by increasing the brideprice.
The last comparative static result provides a direct test of Boserup/Goody's hypothesis according to which an increasing role of men in agricultural activities ought to result in falling brideprices and, ultimately, in the emergence of the dowry system. It is evident from (2) that his prediction does not hold in all cases, but is nevertheless quite likely to be verified. In particular, a sufficient condition for it is that the elasticity of v's density function, G'(v*), is smaller than -1.
7 Such a condition is not very stringent given the fact that G' (v*) , by definition of a density function, is sharply declining towards zero. We thus provide a theoretical account of the Boserup/Goody's hypothesis. Instead of relying on the commonsense demand argument (see supra, Section 1), we invoke the intra-household bargaining mechanism underlying the demand shift caused by the lower productive contribution of women. Indeed, realizing that women are no more worth the payment made to marry them, men are more likely to induce a divorce. Anticipating such an outcome, parents require lower brideprices for their daughters. It is thus evident that an interaction between supply and demand is explicitly introduced by the strategic framework explaining why the effect cannot be signed unambiguously in all generality. None the less, a mild assumption regarding the groom's type density enables us to predict the impact of agricultural intensification on brideprices.
From the results synthesized in (2), it is evident that the impact on brideprices of modernization, understood as the combined effect of many of the above-analyzed factors, is ambiguous.
In particular, if an increased sensitiveness of fathers to their daughters' own perceptions of their happiness and a growing role of men in agriculture following intensification of agricultural techniques (itself a result of population growth and agricultural commercialization) tend to push down brideprice amounts, rising levels of women's education and their enlarging access to non-agricultural employment opportunities have the opposite effect. To allow for the effects arising from the marriage market would only add to the indetermination of the time trend in brideprices as modernization proceeds. As a matter of fact, while a diminishing incidence of polygamy should have the effect of causing brideprices to fall (since demand for women of marriageable age diminishes), a comparatively quickly rising age of girls at marriage (compared with boys) would make girls of marriageable age more scarce, all other things remaining equal.
The aforementioned ambiguity does not however prevent us from making precise predictions and, in particular, to contrast the expected evolution of brideprices in urban and peri-urban areas with that likely to be observed in rural areas, especially if the latter retain a number of traditional characteristics. More precisely, we can foretell that brideprices are likely to grow in the former areas under the joint impact of higher levels of women's education and women's employment outside the household economy as well as the rapid decline of polygamous unions. By contrast, it is possible that brideprices fall in the latter areas, if there is relatively modest advance in women's education and nonagricultural employment while the diffusion of more intensive agricultural practices and that of modern ideas and values stressing the rights of individuals to personal happiness proceed at a significant pace. In fact, if girls are better educated so that they are also exposed to modern values and aspirations yet the growth of non-agricultural opportunities (for women) is rather slow, there are good chances that brideprices will fall provided that male demand for polygamy does not recede too quickly.
Using the definition of v*, the comparative statics can be easily computed for the probability of divorce in equilibrium, Prob = [1 −G(v*)]. We thus have:
∂Prob/∂B > 0; ∂Prob/∂β = 0; ∂Prob/∂W = 0; ∂Prob/∂a > 0; ∂Prob/∂c > 0 (3)
These are partial effects that ignore the impact of the parameters' variations via B.
Two final remarks are in order. The first one relates to the above-hinted possibility that the fall of brideprices will eventually lead to a transformation of the brideprice payment system into the dowry system. In our model, the reversal occurs when the brideprice amount, B, becomes negative. The specification of the daughter's utility then implies that she would take her dowry along with her in case of separation. This acts as a threat which may compel the husband to contribute fairly to the household even though it is costly for him to do so. If the range of v does not comprise sufficiently low values, the husband, rather than the wife, becomes the spouse susceptible of being locked in the marriage (although this case is not frontally contemplated in our model since the husband does not decide to stay or divorce). Note furthermore that, if c were too small, no divorce would be predicted in the model under the dowry system. Indeed, it would always be in the interest of the husband to contribute fairly to the household.
The second remark has to do with the possibility that the father instead of the daughter is expected to repay the brideprice in the event of divorce. Contrary to intuition, the model that would then obtain is almost similar to the one discussed above. The reason underlying this similarity is that, by appropriately changing the units in which the daughter's utility is measured, we can make the altruism factor β equal to the marginal utility of the repaid brideprice. Formally, the daughter's utility and her father's utility become, respectively:
If U F is measured in (β/γ) units of the local public good jointly produced by the household rather than in full units of the same, U D in U F must be multiplied by (γ/β) in order that the father's indifference curves remain the same as before. We thus have:
to be compared with:
In fact, the only difference between the basic model and the variant considered here is that the lock-in phenomenon could be excluded by the assumption that W > f(1 -a/2), implying that the woman earns more by separating than by staying with her husband when he does not contribute fairly to the household.
Econometric methodology and results
Methodological considerations
In this section, we want to test for the most central prediction of the model presented above, namely the presence of a negative relationship between the brideprice and the probability of divorce expected by the father of the bride. This is done by estimating a system of two equations : a brideprice equation and a divorce equation. The first one can be interpreted as the best response curve of the father of the bride, while the second viewpoint is rather the groom's best response curve. In the first equation, an instrument for the risk of divorce appears on the right-hand side as a proxy for the father's expectation regarding the groom's propensity to misbehave. In the second equation, the brideprice actually paid appears on the right-hand side because this information is already revealed when the groom chooses his conjugal strategy (hence there is no need to instrument here). The estimation of this system of equations enables us to assess the aggregate impact of strategic interactions on the likelihood of divorce and on the woman's welfare. Very serious methodological problems arise when one tries to estimate a divorce and a brideprice equations and to interpret the results with a view to testing our model. Fortunately, our Senegalese dataset allows for the testing of the signs of almost all the parameters present in the model. Thus, the woman's education and economic activity (or lack thereof) at the time of marriage are correlated with her outside option in case of divorce (W). The parameter β is partly represented by whether the person receiving the brideprice (often the father of the bride) is financially responsible in the event of divorce. The civil situation (widow, separated, single) of the woman before marriage is wellknown to influence the groom's willingness to pay a high brideprice (see the function G in the model) and to act for the better rather than for the worse subsequently.
The fact that partners have freely chosen each other rather than have the marriage arranged by their families also provides us with a proxy for the groom's expected type. As a matter of fact, we hypothesize that in the case of love marriages welfare derived from the household is more important to the groom than the prospect of recouping the brideprice by causing a divorce. Such preference pattern is known to brides' parents who adjust their brideprice demand accordingly, that is, by raising the amount required.
Finally, in order to indirectly measure the relative productivities of husband and wife within the household, a time index is incorporated into the equation which measures the number of years elapsed between the time of the marriage and the time of interview. The idea is that, with the gradual spreading of irrigated agriculture along the Senegal river during the last decades, one expects the productive role of women to have gradually declined over time relative to the role of men (as suggested by Boserup and Goody, see supra Section 1). Of course, the time variable encompasses a lot of other influences as well. Yet, although it cannot be properly identified, the Boserup/Goody's effect is at least controlled for and thereby prevented from creating biases in our estimates of the other effects.
Special attention is devoted to the way we represent divorce. The model is a one-period game, but a divorce occurring ten years after marriage is quite different from one occurring two years after it. The net present value of the brideprice to be repaid is indeed much lower in the first case. As a result, a divorce equation based on a binary dependent variable is not satisfactory. For this equation, since we are fortunate enough to have available data about the duration of marriages, we chose a survival-time model (or "duration model") instead. In this kind of model, the dependent variable (denoted by λ) is the probability of divorcing at period T conditional on having stayed together until time (T-1). A reasonable assumption in this set-up is that the distribution of marriage duration is exponential 8 , with a parameter depending on the regressors. In the data, a vast majority of marriages did not end by a divorce (about 18 percent of sample women have divorced or separated at least once) and their duration is therefore regarded as right-censored. The relative paucity of uncensored cases is not a problem in duration models. If we denote by D the observed marriage duration, by W a vector of regressors, and by u a residual term, the divorce model can be summarized as follows:
where f is the exponential transfer function and u is a residual 9 ; D* = D if the marriage ends with a divorce, and D* > D otherwise.
The likelihood function associated with this model is numerically maximized by a number of statistical packages, including Stata (used here).
Methodological problems also appear in the equation of brideprices. Firstly, a significant number of brideprices (more than one-third of the sample) have been set to 15,000 CFA, while it is only under special conditions (levirates, re-marriages at old age) that a lower amount is observed. A reasonable estimation procedure must therefore assume that the dependent variable is leftcensored at that level. The Tobit technique is specially designed for that problem. If we denote by B the observed brideprice, by v a residual term, and by X a vector of regressors, our estimated equation looks as follows:
The most serious problem in both equations is the endogeneity of several regressors. The girl's level of education is generally chosen by her family, who may pay attention to the impact of this decision on her marriage prospects. This is a very clear case of simultaneity bias. Once it is controlled, education has two opposite effects on the brideprice. On the one hand, the woman's outside option (parameter W in the model) is higher if she is educated. As a result, her father may be tempted to require a higher brideprice, anticipating that in case of divorce she will be able to fend for herself reasonably well. The requirement of a higher brideprice is all the more likely if the husband attaches a high intrinsic value to being married to an educated woman (implying a low expectation for v in the model), which discourages him from pushing her to leave. On the other hand, an educated women is better able to make her viewpoint heard by her family when the brideprice is being discussed; this effect is reflected in a high value for the parameter β in our model. The first effect pushes the brideprice up, while the second one depresses it, so that the total impact may be of either sign. Moreover, the effect of education on the brideprice presumably differs between arranged marriages and love marriages: in the latter case, a high education level 9 If λ is the conditional divorce probability, then the probability of having the marriage last exactly T periods is λ(1-λ) T-1 , then it is clear that the expected marriage duration f(λ) is
enhances the threat of elopement used as a bargaining device by women. An interaction term between education and the type of marriage must therefore be added in the specification.
The type of marriage itself must be instrumented for in the brideprice equation. For one thing, true simultaneity suggests that the type of marriage may be influenced by the opportunities to extract a good brideprice from the groom. In other words, a father might well turn down a groom's offer because he expects a higher brideprice from a marriage of another nature (arranged or freely chosen). For those who do not like this kind of rather Machiavellian stories, there exists another justification for instrumentation: unobserved determinants of the brideprice and of marriage duration are correlated with the propensity to freely choose one's partner. Since those unobserved determinants are left in the residual term, the latter is correlated with the 'chosen vs arranged marriage' dummy if we don't instrument for this regressor. In the divorce equation, the type of marriage is not instrumented for because it is predetermined and publicly known before divorce can occur. A correlation of the type of marriage with unobserved determinants of the odds of divorce would actually be good news, since they then become partly observed through this dummy and less (wasted) information is left in the residual.
For the sake of illustration, consider the case of a woman with an independent character (unobserved trait). She wants to choose her husband herself and, moreover, she has enough willpower to convince her father to require a brideprice affordable by her lover. In the brideprice equation, we do not want to include the effect of the woman's character into the coefficient of the binary variable reflecting the type of marriage (arranged or not). In the context of our story, failing to instrument for this dummy would bias its coefficient downwards. Indeed, the woman's intervention to keep down the brideprice would then be ascribed to the dummy, with the effect that the expected positive coefficient would be spuriously low. On the contrary, in the divorce equation, the type of marriage, a publicly known information at the time of decision, reveals the woman's character so that the latter's influence on marriage duration is not completely bypassed.
The brideprice and the risk of divorce are of course co-determined, as shown in the model. However, there is a big difference between the two basic equations of our model. The divorce probability is positively correlated with the actual brideprice along the best-response curve of the groom. By contrast, along the best response curve of the bride's family, the equilibrium brideprice is negatively correlated with the groom's propensity to trigger a divorce rather than with the actual occurrence of divorce (obviously unknown at the time of marriage). In the brideprice equation, a proxy for the marriage duration must therefore be interpreted as the father's expectation of the groom's type (computed from the distribution function G in the model). Plausibly, the father of the bride has a better information than us about the chances of divorce.
Because the proxy is imperfectly defined, its coefficient will be biased towards zero without its sign being altered: if its estimated value turns out to be significant, we can a fortiori be sure that the father's expectation about the groom determines the brideprice. After trying various instruments for the marriage duration (expected median duration, expected mean duration, cumulative divorce probability after ten years,...), we settled for the predicted conditional hazard rate 10 (λ itself). We expect a negative sign for its coefficient. This is the crucial prediction derived from our model.
Endogeneity in a specification with qualitative or censored dependent variables must be treated according to the method of instrumentation described by Mallar (1976) . A first-stage equation is estimated using exogenous variables only; the predicted index of this estimation is the instrument that replaces the endogenous dummy in the second-stage equation. This technique was originally developed for simultaneous probit equations, but it generalises in a straightforward way for other specifications. The key issue is to find relevant exogenous variables to construct the instruments and identification constraints for the second-stage equations. In this instance, all the exogenous variables present in these second-stage equations can be complemented with three additional regressors that are excluded from the brideprice equation.
The major inconvenience in using instruments for qualitative or censored variables is the loss of reliable standard errors. Actually, estimators may not be normally distributed at all. Since statistical inference is critical for our declared goal of testing the model, a special care is devoted to constructing a confidence interval and a significance for most of the estimated coefficients.
We choose to bootstrap the whole estimation procedure, including the first-stage computations of the instruments. Bootstrapping consists in drawing with replacement in the original sample to get a new sample of the same size, for which the estimation is performed. By doing so a large number of times, an empirical distribution is generated for each estimated coefficient. Confidence intervals may then be constructed without any assumption about asymptotic distributions. Even so, two exogenous regressors which are binary variables often take a zero value; in most of the new samples drawn for the bootstrap, they came out with an identically zero value; as a result, confidence intervals are not available for their estimated coefficients.
It must be emphasized that our bootstrap procedure takes into account the clustered sampling approach followed during our fieldwork, that is, the fact that the sampling procedure has taken place in two successive steps: the random selection of the villages, on the one hand, and the random selection of women within each selected village, on the other hand. Two-stage, clustered sampling has a non-trivial effect on the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients, even though it does not affect the values of these coefficients. In the present instance, it turned out that correcting for clustered sampling did not affect the significance of our estimations.
Results
We are now in a position to discuss the econometric results obtained with the above-explained methodology. Let us first consider the second-stage brideprice equation the estimation of which is presented in Table 3 .
The dependent variable, brideprice, is the monetary brideprice paid by the groom's to the bride's family. Note that the observation unit is the marriage, which explains why we have more observations (148) than there are women in our sample. That the practice of bridewealth payments is widespread in the Senegal river valley is evident from the fact that in more than 97 percent of the marriage cases in our sample such payments were made by the groom (or his father) to the bride. If we consider only money payments, the proportion falls only very slightly, to 95 percent. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------brideprice |
Coef. 
BS sig BS average BS conf.interval (90%) -----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
/sigma | 31361.33 n.a.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: An instrumented variable is marked with a star.
Obs. summary: 106 uncensored observations 42 left-censored observations
Regarding explanatory factors, the first term on the right-hand side of the brideprice equation, labelled time, is a continuous variable that controls for the effects of passing time, including inflation, changes in the relative scarcity of women of marriageable age, as well as possible shifts in agricultural technology with the resulting fall of the relative productivity of women. It is apparent that, once all the other explanatory factors present in the regression are controlled for, the effect of time on brideprice amounts vanishes. Most plausibly, this is a reflection of the opposing influences of a variety of factors that are correlated with time.
The second explanatory variable, called nrgifts, is a dummy which is equal to one when, in addition to the monetary brideprice, the bride's family has received precious gifts under the form of clothes and jewels. Since this practice is most commonly followed by rich families, nrgifts serves as a control term that takes care of a few special cases.
The third variable, actmar, is another dummy introduced to test whether the amount of the brideprice is influenced by the bride having a professional activity before marriage. This happens with a very small frequency, so that a bootstrapped confidence interval is not available: in many sub-samples, the dummy takes on a constant (zero) value. Nonetheless, the estimator can be interpreted, albeit with care given the impossibility to make any statistical inference. The average impact is more than 22,000 CFA (about 34 euros), to be compared with a sample average of the brideprice of 37,000 CFA. It is negative, indicating that the groom's increased willingness to pay and the impact of a higher exit option for the bride are outweighed by the increased ability of the woman to keep the brideprice low through bargaining with her parents.
The variable respons, a dummy equal to one when the recipient of the brideprice is explicitly responsible for its repayment in the event of separation/divorce, has a significant and negative coefficient. This finding is apparently according to commonsense logic since confronted with the risk of repayment the caretaker has an interest in keeping the brideprice down. In our model, however, there is another possible scenario, namely thet the bride's father may want to raise the brideprice to such an extent that it prevents separation through a lock-in effect (which corresponds to the corner solution discussed in Section 3). At an interior solution, the prediction of the model is confirmed by our empirical finding: increased responsibility of the brideprice's recipient in case of divorce lowers the equilibrium brideprice.
An important result emerging from Table 3 is the critical importance, for determination of the brideprice level, of the past conjugal history of the woman concerned. In our estimation, this history is represented by two binary variables, widow and separat. Widow takes on unit value when the woman was a widow at the time of her (re)marriage, and zero value otherwise whereas separat is equal to one when the woman had separated from a previous husband before embarking on a new marriage. The reference situation in which both dummies are equal to zero corresponds to all the cases of women who have married for the first time.
As our estimations show, the brideprice is lower by almost 49,000 CFA (74 Euro) when the woman is a widow at the time of her (re)marriage. This differential neatly exceeds the average brideprice amount computed for the whole sample. No bootstrapped confidence interval could be constructed for the widow dummy, yet the magnitude of its coefficient suggests that its effects cannot be ignored. This conjecture is supported by the significance of a simple means test carried out on the raw data. When the woman is separated or divorced, the brideprice is also lower, but by a smaller margin (7,400 CFA), than the price received for a single girl. These two findings therefore coincide with the reported custom providing that the 'price of virginity',−which is a component of the brideprice− may not be claimed by the bride's family when she was already married in the past (see supra, Section 2). That widows receive lower brideprices than separated women is another expected result since they are comparatively old at the time of their (re)marriage.
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None the less, it must be pointed out that the effect of separat on the brideprice is not statistically significant, which actually confirms the result of a simple means test carried out on the raw data: the average brideprice for separated/divorced women is lower than that obtained for single girls, yet, unlike what was found in the case of widows, the difference is not statistically significant.
12 Combined with the previous findings and comments, this suggests that the 'price of virginity' does not represent a sizeable portion of the brideprice.
The conditional divorce hazard rate, labelled riskdiv* in the above table, −to be carefully distinguished from the separat variable, which refers to an actual situation obtaining at the time of a (re)marriage− appears to have a negative influence on the brideprice of the order of no less than 55,000 CFA (84 euros) per unit. For example, a groom with 50% probability of treating his wife in a way that triggers a divorce in any period for a given brideprice (odds of .5/.5 = 1) will be asked to pay about 42 euros less than a groom with a 33% probability of behaving badly (odds of .33/.66 = 1/2). Such a finding confirms the model's major prediction that a comparatively high divorce risk, as evaluated ex ante by the father of the bride, leads to a relatively low brideprice.
The influence on marriage payments of the bride's autonomy in choosing her spouse is measured by the coefficient of the instrumented variable lovemar*. The original, non-instrumented binary variable, has unit value when the woman has freely chosen her husband, and zero value when her marriage has been arranged by her parents. The instrument is the predicted index of a probit estimation on exogenous regressors that have been spelt out above. What Table  3 shows is that woman's autonomy in selecting her spouse has the effect of raising her brideprice by about 13,250 CFA (20 euros), which is statistically significant and borne out by a simple examination of raw data: indeed, the average brideprice works out to 45,700 CFA (70 euros) in the case of love marriages as against only 33,800 CFA (51 euros) in the case of arranged marriages (a statistically significant difference).
As pointed out in Subsection 4.1, the positive influence of a love marriage on the brideprice is actually the outcome predicted by our model. This being said, there is a rival explanation for such a positive effect. As a matter of fact, our data reveal that the type of marriage (love or arranged) and the existence of a kinship link between the bride and the groom are strongly correlated: 87 percent of arranged marriages are contracted among partners with kinship relationships while only 58 percent of love marriages have this characteristic. Since bargaining around marriage payments is presumably tougher with strangers than with relatives, we expect brideprices to be lower in the case of arranged marriages. Moreover, a demand effect can be conjectured in so far as the willingness to pay is likely to be higher when the groom has freely chosen his mate.
Education of the bride does not appear to significantly affect the brideprice except through an interaction term with the propensity to freely choose one's spouse. The variable educ* is the predicted index of an ordered probit estimation of three categories of education: one comprising women who did not complete primary schooling, one with those who did yet could not complete secondary schooling, and another one comprising women who got a secondary school degree. The interaction term loveXed* is the product between the two instrumental variables lovemar* and educ*. As is evident from the table, only the interaction term has a significant coefficient which is negative. This means that the brideprice is lower for educated women only when they have freely chosen their husband. In the case of arranged marriages, the education of the bride does not affect the brideprice.
That there is no independent effect of women's education on brideprices should not come as a surprise since two opposite effects are actually at play. On the one hand, the groom's willingness to pay and the bride's exit option are higher when the woman is better educated and, as a result, the brideprice should go up in terms of our model. On the other hand, a better educated woman can be expected to wield more bargaining power in the course of marriage negotiations and to use that power to keep down the brideprice amount. The conditional negative effect of the woman's education arises from the fact that in the case of love marriages the bride may credibly threaten to elope with her suitor if the brideprice is set at an unrealistically high level. Since we have seen above that brideprices are higher in the case of love marriages, the effect of the interaction term goes against the effect of the type of marriage when the woman is relatively educated. The estimated coefficients obtained are such that the two effects cancel each other out.
Let us now say a few words about our first-stage equations (see Appendix). Regarding the construction of riskdiv*, an important exogenous variable is the dummy firstwife indicating whether the woman is the first wife of her husband (in the case of monogamous marriages, she obviously is the first wife). As for lovemar*, the critical role is played by another dummy, denoted rankmar, which is equal to one when the marriage concerned is not the woman's first marriage. The coefficient is positive, confirming the lesson previously learned when examining raw data, namely that women have a tendency to comply with the system of arranged marriages upon their first conjugal experience but to call that system into question when they re-marry. Finally, the instrumental variable educ* is constructed essentially on the basis of two age dummies: the first one, called age1, is equal to one for women aged between 27 -34 years while the second one, called age2, is equal to one for women who are more than 34 years old. Not unsurprisingly, it turns out that age1 has a clearly significant and positive effect on the woman's education. In other words, the youngest among our sample women are comparatively less educated than the women in the intermediate age category, presumably because they got married at a lower age.
Carefully note that the variables firstwife, rankmar, age1 and age2 are excluded from the brideprice equation with the result that this equation is properly identified. Bear in mind that, given our interpretation of the divorce equation as the groom's best response curve, all the marriage variables are predetermined at the time of the divorce decision (see supra). Therefore, the problem of identification does not arise in the case of this equation that we are going to discuss below.
We can now turn to the second-stage divorce equation the estimation of which is presented in Table 4 . The dependent variable is riskdiv which in the present context represents an objective probability rather than a perceived risk as is the case in the brideprice equation (where it appears as a simulated explanatory variable, implying that residuals are not taken into account). 
Unlike what we observed in the brideprice equation, the coefficient of the time variable is significant, and it is negative. This means that marriages contracted in older times are less risky. Such a finding is according to expectations since modern, individual-centered values diffused through varied forms of contact with the Western world (including exposure to mass communication media), have the effect of making divorce decisions easier. By contrast, education does not appear to influence the likelihood of divorce. In this equation, education is represented by two binary, hierarchically ranked variables: educprim, which is equal to one when the woman has completed primary school, and educseco, indicating whether the woman has completed secondary school. Remember that a woman's education is publicly known at the time of her marriage, so that there is no need to instrument for this categorical variable.
On a priori grounds, it is actually hard to predict the impact of education on the woman's conditional probability to divorce since there are several effects that do not necessarily go into the same direction. In particular, educated women think more carefully before getting involved in a long-term love relationship or, if the marriage is arranged, before giving their consent to the match proposed by their parents. As a result, the risk of divorce should be smaller for them. On the other hand, however, education has the effect of reducing the cost of a divorce decision, for at least two reasons. First, by instilling into women more self-confidence, assertiveness (including the ability to question existing institutions and mores) and autonomy, education makes a breach of traditional commitment easier. Second, by providing access to better income opportunities, it confers upon women a higher exit option value in the event of separation.
When a woman is her husband's first wife, the risk of divorce is smaller. Bear in mind that the category of first wifes comprises all cases of monogamous marriages. Interestingly, though, the result holds true even if we would consider only polygamous marriages. The higher status of the first wife in a polygamous union probably explains why she is less likely to be parted with.
13 Another 13 When the number of children born of the marriage is introduced as an explanatory variable in the divorce equation, it turns out to have a highly significant and negative coefficient, indicating that a larger family tends to discourage the break-up of the marriage. If we did not include this variable in the final report of estimations presented in Table 4 , it is because it is liable to be endogenous: when spouses are more confident in the durability of their union, they are more likely to have children, say, because they are staying longer together. Note that, when the number of children is taken into account, the coefficient of firstwife remains significant. Likewise, if introduced into the divorce equation, the dummy variable (called migrant) indicating whether the woman's husband works abroad comes out with a highly significant and negative sign. But again, there is a risk of an endogeneity bias: indeed, a husband may decide to go abroad for income-earning purposes only if he stands assured that his wife will remain in the native village and take continuous care of the land and the children. Because we are unable to find proper instruments to control for these two endogeneity biases, we have refrained from presenting the estimated results with the corresponding variables introduced in the divorce equation. The same holds true of two other variables, namely polygamy, −indicating whether the marriage is polygamous or monogamous− and the woman's age at marriage. As a matter of fact, both variables are strongly significant variable is lovemar, the coefficient of which is negative. In fact, there are two reasons why such a result conforms with our intuition. For one thing, love marriages are presumably more successful than arranged marriages because the matching has been left free to the persons concerned. The second reason arises from a constraint that renders the prospect of separation more risky for women who did not go through an arranged marriage. Indeed, they have to bear total responsibility for marriage failure, which typically implies that their family will not easily come to help them in the event of separation or divorce. On the contrary, when marriages have been arranged, in times of crisis women can call forth traditional mechanisms of social protection based on their right to return to their own family in order to get material and psychological support. The evidence available nevertheless suggests that this second argument ought not to be overplayed: parents today seem to behave in an essentially similar manner when a daughter is separated from her husband, whether the union had been arranged or not.
Whether there exists a kinship relation between husband and wife does not apparently affect the risk of divorce. This is not a robust result, however. As a matter of fact, the coefficient of famlink (a dummy which is equal to one when spouses are related through kinship ties) becomes significant (and negative) once the variable lovemar with which it is strongly correlated (see supra) is dropped from the equation. Prior family links between spouses have therefore the effect of diminishing the risk that the marriage will be broken. The likely reason behind this result is that pressures exercised by families concerned to prevent separation or divorce of their children are stronger when they were previously related.
The coefficient of the variable separat is positive and not far from being significant. One would have perhaps expected that, when a woman has already separated from a previous husband, the risk of a new marriage failure is clearly increased. It could nevertheless be retorted that a woman with a negative past conjugal experience will be more careful before engaging in a new marital link.
Last but not least, the coefficient of brideprice is positive and highly significant. Our hypothesis according to which higher brideprice amounts tend to give rise to conjugal tensions and ill-treatment of wives that may eventually result in divorce, is thus borne out by the available econometric evidence. One implication is that this perverse effect eventually dominates the other effect whereby high brideprices discourage women from leaving their husband owing to brideprice repayment problems. Combined with the corresponding result obtained in Table 3 , such a finding establishes the existence of the reciprocal relationship between brideprice and divorce risk that is predicted by the model presented in Section 3.
endogenous and, since we do not have available adequate instruments, we are unable to isolate their specific effects on the risk of divorce.
Conclusion
Marriage decisions are obviously critical decisions, whether they are made by parents in the framework of an arranged union or by the people concerned themselves on the basis of a love attraction. In so far as payments are to be made to render the marriage socially valid, it is difficult to conceive that they are not the result of strategic thinking. In particular, the suspicion that, by requiring a high brideprice for consenting to give his daughter to a man, a father may cause her harm in future conjugal life and perhaps even damage the prospect of a lasting union, will most likely lead him to weigh the advantages of a high marriage payment against such a risk. Lower brideprices may follow. In this paper, it has been rigorously shown that the above prediction can indeed be inferred from a model built around the idea of strategic and sequential decision-making.
Other interesting comparative-static results have been derived, such as the impact of better exit options for the woman; the influence of technological change in agriculture when land becomes more valuable (an effect highlighted by Boserup and Goody) ; and the effect of the increasing willingness of parents to assess their daughter's well-being from her own standpoint rather than paternalistically (as reflected in the rising degree of the father's altruism).
The latter phenomenon occurs at least partly because women, especially those who received education or already went through an experience of marriage failure in the past, have become more emancipated and vocal in asserting their own right to happines. Women have three different reasons for opposing high brideprices. First, they may worry that the man whom they love will be unable to pay the brideprice required by the parents. Second, they may fear that the requirement of a high brideprice will cause a lot of conjugal tensions, possibly leading to their ill-treatment. And, third, they may think that separation will be more difficult for them if it is hampered by brideprice repayment problems.
On the empirical level, the paper has brought forward two kinds of evidence, drawn from the Senegal river valley, in favour of the thesis that brideprices tend to be determined strategically in the light of their adverse effect on women's well-being in married life and the concomitant risk of marriage failure. The first type of evidence is essentially qualitative, derived from queries about opinions of both men and women. As for the second type, it has relied on hard econometric testing using brideprice data and information regarding various characteristics of women and their marriages.
The most important result supports our central proposition according to which there exists a two-way relationship between brideprices and the risk of marriage break-up. More precisely, duly controlling for endogenous effects, it has been shown that the higher the perceived risk of divorce the lower the brideprice set for the marriage, whereas, in the other way around, a higher brideprice tends to increase the actual risk of divorce.
Other significant results that have been interpreted in the text include the following ones. First, brideprices tend to be higher for women who have freely chosen their husband than for women who went through an arranged marriage. Moreover, the risk of divorce is lower for the former than for the latter category. Note, in addition, that the order of marriage bears significantly on the propensity to go for a love marriage: love marriages are more characteristic of women who have already been married before than of women entering into their first marriage (and are therefore more subject to the influence of their parents). Second, there is no effect of women's education on brideprices nor on the risk of divorce. Yet, the brideprice appears to be smaller for educated women when they have freely chosen their husband. Third, brideprices are lower for widows but, perhaps surprisingly, not significantly so for separated women. Since widows generally remarry at a later age than separated women, this suggests that the customary component of the brideprice plays a rather insignificant role nowadays. Fourth, when a woman is her husband's first wife, the risk of divorce is smaller. Fifth, the same result obtains when the families of the spouses are linked through kinship ties. And, sixth, marriages contracted in older times are less risky than more recent ones.
A final remark is in order. A rival theory would contend that ill-treatment of women for whom high brideprices have been paid results from the declining economic value of women relative to men (say, for the reasons put forward by Goody and Boserup) , therefore causing a maladjustment of brideprices, rather than from the diffusion of new values emphasizing women's rights to happiness. If this is true, so the argument would run, conscious attempts by brides and their parents to limit the amount of the brideprice required may be seen as a mechanism aimed at bringing brideprices back to their equilibrium level. This interpretation, however, does not stand the scrutiny of the facts highlighted by our econometric analysis. In particular, the correlation of brideprices with the practice of love marriage, the availability of exit options for the woman, and parents' responsibility regarding brideprice repayment in the event of marriage failure cannot be predicted by a disequilibrium theory. In such a theory, indeed, the marriage payment is only a function of the prevailing custom and the extent of disequilibrium measured by the expected divorce rate.
Appendix
A set of three first-stage equations must be estimated in order to construct instrumental variables for riskdiv, lovemar and educ. The first one is a duration model based on the same assumptions as the divorce equation presented in Table  4 . The second one is a probit model of lovemar. The third one is an ordered probit model since education is represented by the categorical variable educ taking on three values (as it is mentioned in the text).
Among the exogenous variables that are used in the following equations, some appear as regressors neither in Table 3 nor in Table 4 . These are firstwife, rankmar, age2734, age3567, ethny and landaccess. Firstwife indicates whether the woman is her husband's first wife (including all the cases of monogamous marriages). Rankmar takes on unit value when the woman had already been married prior to the considered marriage. Age2734 and age3567 are binary variables that indicate respectively if the woman is between 27 and 34 years old and if the woman is 35 years old or more. Ethny is a dummy indicating that the woman belongs to the haalpular ethnic group. In the sample, all women are either haalpular or wolof. Finally, landaccess is equal to one if and only if the woman has access to land outside the family system -generally parcels in irrigated perimeters initiated by village authorities or development projects and organisations.
All these variables are excluded from the second-stage equations. Including any of them gives rise to no significant change in the performances of those estimations, as is shown by likelihood-ratio tests. Since riskdiv* is heavily correlated with firstwife, as is lovemar* with rankmar and educ* with age2734 and age3567, we can be sure that the second-stage equations are properly identified.
Exponential regression -log relative-hazard form LR chi2(9) = 49.65 Log likelihood = -89.909492 Prob > chi2 = 0. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ordered probit estimates LR chi2(10) = 44.74 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -126.84868
Pseudo R2 = 0. .9299263 -------------+----------------------------------------------------------------_cut1 | .3113154 .3154644 (Ancillary parameters) _cut2 | 2.210973 .
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the three first-stage equations, the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero can be rejected with a high degree of confidence. For example, a divorce occurred in 46% of the marriages for which the predicted value of the conditional hazard rate of divorce is above 17%, while only 15% of the other marriages ended up so. Likewise, in instances where the predicted probability of a love marriage is above 50%, two-third of the cases were actually love marriages, while this fraction is halved for the other cases. Bear in mind that the existence of kinship ties between spouses (as represented by the dummy famlink) is strongly correlated with lovemar. If famlink is not introduced in the first-stage equation for lovemar, it is because it is the choice of a love rather than an arranged marriage that influences the existence or the absence of kinship ties between the bride and the groom, and not the other way around.
As for educ*, its relationship with the original education categories is shown in the following table. Means testing is significant at more than 99% of confidence. As a conclusion, we can safely state that the three instrumental variables educ*, lovemar* and riskdiv* are satisfactory reflections of the underlying raw data.
